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11. ABOUT THE PROJECT
1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT
The Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) is a research tool that was designed to identify potential risks to media pluralism 
in the Member States of the European Union. This narrative report has been produced within the framework of the 
second EU-wide implementation of the MPM, carried out in 2017. The implementation was conducted in 28 EU 
Member States, Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM) and Turkey with the support of a grant 
awarded by the European Union to the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) at the European 
University Institute.
1.2 METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
The CMPF cooperated with experienced, independent national researchers to carry out the data collection and to 
author the narrative reports, except in the cases of Malta and Italy where data collection was carried out centrally by 
the CMPF team. The research is based on a standardised questionnaire and apposite guidelines that were developed 
by the CMPF. The data collection was carried out between June and December 2017.
In Turkey, the CMPF partnered with Yasemin Inceoglu, Ceren Sozeri and Tirse Erbaysal Filibeli, who conducted the 
data collection and annotated the variables in the questionnaire and interviewed relevant experts. The scores assessing 
the risks for media pluralism were provided by the CMPF and calculated according to the algorithm developed by the 
Centre itself. The national report was reviewed by CMPF staff. Moreover, to ensure accurate and reliable findings, a 
group of national experts in each country reviewed the answers to particularly evaluative questions (see Annexe II 
for the list of experts).
Risks to media pluralism are examined in four main thematic areas, which are considered to capture the main areas 
of risk for media pluralism and media freedom: Basic Protection, Market Plurality, Political Independence and Social 
Inclusiveness. The results are based on the assessment of a number of indicators for each thematic area (see Figure 1 
below).
Basic Protection Market Plurality Political 
Independence
Social Inclusiveness
Protection of freedom of 
expression
Transparency of media 
ownership
Political control over media 
outlets
Access to media for 
minorities
Protection of right to 
information
Media ownership 
concentration (horizontal)
Editorial autonomy Access to media for local/
regional communities and for 
community media
Journalistic profession, 
standards and protection
Cross-media concentration 
of ownership and 
competition enforcement
Media and democratic electoral 
process
Access to media for people 
with disabilities
Independence and 
effectiveness of the media 
authority
Commercial & owner 
influence over editorial 
content
State regulation of resources 
and support to media sector
Access to media for women
Universal reach of 
traditional media and 
access to the Internet
Media viability Independence of PSM 
governance and funding
Media literacy
The results for each domain and indicator are presented on a scale from 0 to 100%. Scores between 0 and 33% are 
considered low risk, 34 to 66% are medium risk, while those between 67 and 100% are high risk. On the level of 
indicators, scores of 0 were rated 3% and scores of 100 were rated 97% by default, to avoid an assessment of total 
absence or certainty of risk. For more information on MPM methodology, see the CMPF report “Monitoring Media 
Pluralism in Europe: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2016 in EU-28, Montenegro and Turkey”, http://
cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/46786 
2Disclaimer: The content of the report does not necessarily reflect the views of the CMPF or the EC, but represents the 
views of the national country team that carried out the data collection and authored the report. Due to updates and 
refinements in the questionnaire, the MPM2017 scores may not be fully comparable with MPM2016 ones. For more 
details, see the CMPF report on MPM2017, soon available on http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/ 
32. INTRODUCTION
Turkey obtained the status of European Union candidate country in 1999 and accession negotiations started in October 
2005. The government has adopted some progressive legal reforms such as the right to information act, and the right 
to broadcast languages traditionally used by Turkish citizen in their daily lives in accordance with the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) standards since 2004. However, as pointed out in 2014 and 2015 ECHR Progress Reports 
on Turkey, serious backsliding has been observed on freedom of expression and press both online and offline. The 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Nils Muižnieks pointed out the concerns regarding the 
restrictive policies over freedom of expression and media freedom particularly risen after the 15 July coup attempt. 
On 6th July 2017 the European Parliament voted to suspend accession talks with Turkey.
The country has a population of 80.810.525, as of 2017.1 The official language is Turkish. Even though the country 
is not socially and culturally homogeneous, only Armenians, Greeks and Jews are recognized as ethnic minorities 
regarding to the Treaty of Lausanne. Since 1965, there is no official data on the size of the minority population in 
Turkey. The research of the private agency KONDA (Research and Consultancy) entitled “ The Social Structure in 
Turkey” in 2006 gives detailed information about the estimated population of minority groups and indicates Kurds as 
the largest ethnic minority group, the Alevis as the largest religious minority group. 
On July 20 2016, after the failed coup attempt, a three- month state of emergency had been declared and since then, 
Turkey has been ruled under the state of emergency by decrees. The government can easily pass bills that have the 
force of law. As of today, more than 110 thousands civil servants were dismissed on the grounds of orchestrating the 
failed coup. According to the Platform for Independent Journalism P24 at least 153 media workers are in jail, 200 
media outlets are shut down as of March 15, 20182.
Besides the state of emergency, on April 16, 2017, Turkey’s constitutional referendum was held and the amendments 
that would transform the country from parliamentary democracy into a presidential system had been accepted. With 
the new constitution, the powers of the president have been expanded. 
The economic situation also leads to a new crisis. The economic growth recorded the lowest rate of last decade. The 
Turkish lira fell to a new record day by day against the US dollar and Euro. Recently, the prominent credit rating 
agencies downgraded the country’s credit ratings due to raising risk premium. Besides, the government threatened 
frequently to hold a referendum on whether to continue EU membership negotiations due to the critics on human 
rights violations in the EC’s annual Progress Report. 
The economic crisis and the worst performance of the Turkish Lira have affected the media market not only in terms 
of declining of advertising revenues but also increasing paper costs. The dailies importing paper are having difficulty 
with the rise of the currency. On the other hand, the study by Interpress Media Services reveals that nearly 100 
countries watch Turkish TV dramas and Turkey ranks after the U.S. as second in the world in the drama export with 
$350 million in revenue.3
1 Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=30567
2 Platform for Independent Journalism (P24), "Journalists in State of Emergency - 127", 14.03.2018, http://platform24.org/en/  
articles/598/journalists-in-state-of-emergency---127
3  Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey ranks second in TV drama export, 30.09.2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-ranks-
second-in-tv-drama-export-120144 
43. RESULTS FROM THE DATA COLLECTION: 
ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS TO MEDIA 
PLURALISM
Turkey’s risk scores are the highest for many indicators for media pluralism in 2017. Over the past two years, the 
country turned into the world’s biggest prison for journalists according to the 2017 World Press Freedom Index of 
Reporters Without Borders4. Aftermath of the coup-attempt on July 15, 2016, the government has used excessive 
powers under the state of emergency, to purge of media outlets and to silence dissident journalists. According to the 
Platform for Independent Journalism P24 (see above) at least 153 media workers are in jail, about 200 media outlets 
(including community and minority media) are closed as of March 15, 2018.
Cancellation of press cards (about one thousands), and accreditation implementation became new barriers for 
journalistic profession in the country. The Journalist Unions of Turkey announced that more than 10 thousands 
journalists are jobless; thousands still reporting are oppressed, censored, and under threat.
The most watched TV channels and most read newspapers owners are politically affiliated with the government. 
Besides the loss of editorial autonomy in mainstream media outlets; the government controls the media over the 
media owners via “carrot” i.e public procurements and “stick” i.e tax fines tactics”. 
The independence and neutrality of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) was contested more than ever 
before. There is no transparency on media ownership and market shares data, which should be ensured by RTÜK. 
During the referendum process in 2016, an emergency decree removed the powers of the Supreme Board of Election 
to sanction on private televisions to provide impartial coverage . 
The PSM Turkish Radio Television Corporation (TRT) and official news agency, Anadolu Agency (AA) functioned as 
the government’s tool same as it ever was.
There is no policy on the gender equality in media. Current regulations on media literacy and access to media for 
people with disabilities are not  implemented effectively and policies on those issues need to be better developed. 
4  RSF, “Journalism engulfed by the purge”, 2017, https://rsf.org/en/turkey
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63.1 BASIC PROTECTION (81% - HIGH RISK)
The Basic Protection indicators represent the regulatory backbone of the media sector in every contemporary democracy. 
They measure a number of potential areas of risk, including the existence and effectiveness of the implementation of 
regulatory safeguards for freedom of expression and the right to information; the status of journalists in each country, 
including their protection and ability to work; the independence and effectiveness of the national regulatory bodies that 
have competence to regulate the media sector; and the reach of traditional media and access to the Internet.
The indicator on Protection of freedom of expression scores high risk (81%). The Anti-terror Law (TMK, no. 3713 
of 1991) and the related articles of Turkish Penal Code (TCK) are interpreted and applied in ways that impede the 
freedom of expression of members of Parliament, academics and journalists. The journalists are mostly charged with 
“being a member of an armed organization”, “propagandizing for an illegal organization”, “forming illegal organization”, 
“participating in the coup” and “targeting unity of the state and integrity of the country” over TMK and TCK.
The citizens have the right to apply to the Constitutional Court if there has been an abuse of their constitutional rights. 
On January 11, 2018, the Constitutional Court found in the criminal case of academics and columnists Mehmet Altan 
and Şahin Alpay that their rights were being violated by pre-trial detention and ruled that they should be released. The 
27th High Criminal Court in Istanbul declined to implement the decision by the Constitutional Court. Altan’s appeal 
to the 27th High Court decision was rejected as well. 
In 2017, The ECtHR fined Turkey 1,500 Euros in total in the files of two applicants for “violating freedom of expression” 
however; the Court did not render any verdict about Turkey in terms of arbitrary arrest of the journalists and their 
isolation for months yet. 
Under the state of emergency, August 17, 2017 the Telecommunications and Communication Presidency were shut 
down by decree no.690 allegedly infiltrated by Gulenists and served as a hub of illegal wiretapping over the years5 and 
all authority was carried out to the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) Since last April, 
the world’s biggest online information source Wikipedia has been blocked because it refused to remove unflattering 
references to Turkey’s relationship with Syrian militants and state-sponsored terrorists. As a result officials simply 
banned the whole site. Wikipedia is just one of 127,000 websites blocked in Turkey in addition to 95,000 pages, like 
social media accounts, blog posts and articles that are also blocked on websites6.
The indicator on Protection of right to information scores at the top of high risk (91%). The Law on Right to 
Information has too many ambiguous exemptions such as state secrets, the economic interests of the state, state 
intelligence, administrative investigations, and judicial investigations and prosecutions. In 2014, the amendment to 
5  Yeşil, Sözeri and Khazraee, "Turkey’s Internet Policy after the Coup Attempt: The Emergence of a Distributed Network of Online 
Suppression and Surveillance", Internet Policy Observatory, 2017, http://globalnetpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Turkey1_v6-1.pdf
6  Patrick Kingsley, "Turks Click Away, but Wikipedia Is Gone", The New York Times,10.06.2017, https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/06/10/world/europe/turkey-wikipedia-ban-recep-tayyip-erdogan.html
7the Law on State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) expanded the powers of 
MİT towards accessing all personal data without a court order. The National Intelligence Agency (MİT) was tied to 
president by state of emergency decrees on Aug. 25, 2017.
The indicator on Journalistic profession, standards and protection shows high risk (75%). Even though there is no legal 
restriction to become a journalist, cancellation of press cards, shutting down of media organizations and accreditation 
implementation have become new barriers for the journalistic profession in the country. The unionization rate declined 
to under 2%. The pro-Kurdish Free Journalists Association was shut down with many Kurdish media organization by 
a decree on November 12, 20167. P24 has updated its list of journalists in prison in Turkey, because almost everyday 
new ones enter and some of them are released, as of March 15, there are at least 154 journalists either in pre-trial 
detention or serving prison sentences in country’s prisons8.
The indicator on Independence and effectiveness of the media authority scores high risk (80 %). In October, 2017, 
the third largest party HDP’s quota handed over to the AKP in the composition of the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (RTÜK). In the aftermath of the coup attempt, the government issued decrees-laws ordering the closure 
of 46 TV channels and radio stations, predominantly for alleged links to the Gülen movement. 23 out of 39 TV 
channels and radio channels broadcasting in Kurdish language have been closed without a court decision or a license 
cancellation by RTÜK. The European Commission highlighted the concerns about the independence and neutrality 
of RTÜK in its 2016 Turkey Progress Report9.
3.2 MARKET PLURALITY (54% MEDIUM RISK)
The Market Plurality indicators examine the existence and effectiveness of the implementation of transparency and 
disclosure provisions with regard to media ownership. In addition, they assess the existence and effectiveness of regulatory 
safeguards to prevent horizontal and cross-media concentration of ownership and the role of competition enforcement and 
State aid control in protecting media pluralism. Moreover, they seek to evaluate the viability of the media market under 
examination as well as whether and if so, to what extent commercial forces, including media owners and advertisers, 
influence editorial decision-making.       
7  Platform for Independent Journalism (P24), “Journalists in State of Emergency – 28”, 13 November 2016, http://platform24.org/en/
articles/418/journalists-in-state-of-emergency---28
8  Platform for Independent Journalism (P24), "Journalists in State of Emergency - 127", 14.03.2018, http://platform24.org/en/
articles/598/journalists-in-state-of-emergency---127
9  EC, Comission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2016 Report, 09.11.2016, 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pdf
8The indicator on Transparency of media ownership scores medium risk (50%) The Law No.6112 on the Establishment 
of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Media Services obliges the media companies to notify their identification 
details to RTÜK and make them available on their web sites. However, without the shareholders’ information, these 
details do not ensure transparency of actual ownership structures of media companies. Media company owners and 
their shares can be found on the Trade Registry Gazette online archive if the company’s and shareholders whole names 
are known.
The indicator on Media ownership concentration scores medium risk (42%). There is no audited and transparent 
data on media market share in Turkey. Even though, the protection of competition has been overseen through 
advertising revenues and other sponsorships by RTÜK, according to the law No.6112. However, so far no information 
on percentages has been published. The request of information on market shares - based on within the Right to 
Information Act - presented by the country team to RTÜK was denied on the grounds of “trade secret”.  
The indicator on Cross-media concentration of ownership and competition enforcement scores medium risk (38 %). 
Law No. 6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services provides for rules 
aiming at preventing cross-media concentration but just in the audio-visual sector. There is no limitation in print 
and online media. The monopolisation is prevented via commercial communication revenues limit, which is thirty 
percent. A large slice feeds the TV sector; the newspapers ‘revenues gradually decrease while online media can get 
more shares from the advertising pie. However, online media outlets largely coincide with major media groups in 
Turkey. 10 out of 15 online news portals with a high audience are web sites of print or TV outlets10.
The indicator on Commercial & owner influence over editorial content indicators shows high risk (71%). Many 
journalists are jobless or working under unsecured working conditions under huge risk. On the other hand, the 
journalists from mainstream media are more pessimistic about the future of journalism in Turkey due to widespread 
censorship and self-censorship. According to the Journalists Union of Turkey, more than 10 thousands journalists 
are unemployed11. The Press labour law no.5953 and the self -regulation mechanisms failed to protect editorial 
independence and journalistic autonomy.
The indicator on Media Viability scores high risk (70%). According to the Association of Advertising Agencies, TV and 
online advertising are consistently raising while the newspapers is in decline for the last few years. Audio-visual sector 
took more than 50 % from total advertising revenues at least for 10 years. Under high-pressure climate, alternative 
and independent news organizations are financially very weak. Developing new sources like crowdsourcing are very 
difficult and including the risk of being target of the government or pro-government media. They try to survive by 
motivating the readers to subscribe and/or to buy daily print versions as an act of solidarity.
10  RSF Media Ownership Monitor in Turkey 2016,“Political Affiliations”, https://turkey.mom-rsf.org/en/findings/political-affiliations/
11  European Federation of Journalists, "Turkey: Organising journalists under the state of emergency", 01.12.2016, https://
europeanjournalists.org/blog/2016/12/01/turkey-organising-journalists-under-the-state-of-emergency/
93.3 POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE (91% HIGH RISK)
The Political Independence indicators assess the existence and effectiveness of regulatory safeguards against political 
bias and political control over the media outlets, news agencies and distribution networks. They are also concerned 
with the existence and effectiveness of self-regulation in ensuring editorial independence. Moreover, they seek to evaluate 
the influence of the State (and, more generally, of political power) over the functioning of the media market and the 
independence of  public service media.
The indicator on Political independence of media scores high risk (88%). 7 of the 10 most read dailies and most watched 
TV channels belong to owners who are politically affiliated with the government.12 The dissident pro-Kurdish political 
party HDP members are banned in all TV news and discussion programs13. The big media groups are controlled by 
the government via their owners. For example one of the owners Ethem Sancak, said he’s “in love” with Erdoğan and 
would sacrifice his family for him, and has admitted that the reason of his entrance to the media sector was to support 
him. Then he was elected by Erdoğan to the Central Decision and Executive Board (MKYK) of the ruling party on 
May 22, 2017. Recently, he sold his media outlets to the “prison friend” in 1999 of Erdoğan14.
The indicator on Editorial autonomy scores the highest risk (97%). The prominent case of the political interference 
with media content is Cumhuriyet daily trial. 17 journalists and executives of the daily are on trial, five of them stayed 
in jail for months, the editor-in- chief was released after 495 days on charges of aiding a terrorist organisation through 
the news contents and columns. In the indictment against Cumhuriyet, there are accusations such as “changing the 
paper’s editorial policy”, preparing “violent and divisive news” and “interviewing leaders of terrorist organisations”. Six 
journalists including columnists Ahmet Altan, Mehmet Altan and Nazlı Ilıcak were sentenced to life in prison on the 
grounds of alleged role in failed coup attempt via just their TV appearances and newspaper columns. 
The indicator on Media and democratic electoral process scores also high risk (82 %). The Supreme Election Board’s 
(YSK) monitoring task of private TV channels was removed by the state of emergency decree no.687 on February 
9, 2017 during Turkey’s referendum campaign on constitutional changes. The YSK cannot be able to penalize 
channels that do not comply with impartial coverage and political parties equal access to the media. OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights - Limited Referendum Observation Mission monitoring findings showed 
that three out of the five monitored television stations, including the public TRT1, favoured the ‘Yes’ campaign. The 
‘Yes’ campaign featured prominently in both public and private media, with 76 per cent of total airtime on television 
and 77.5 percent of space in the press, predominantly positive in tone, whereas the ‘No’ campaign received only 23.5 
12  RSF Media Ownership Monitor in Turkey 2016,“Political Affiliations”, https://turkey.mom-rsf.org/en/findings/political-affiliations/
13 Ece Algan, "Media in Turkey before, during and after the referendum ", Open Democracy, 02.06.2017, https://www.opendemocracy.
net/ece-algan/media-in-turkey-before-during-and-after-referendum
14  Hurriyet Daily News, “Erdoğan renews AKP’s A-team with greater youth presence”, 21.05.2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
erdogan-renews-akps-a-team-with-greater-youth-presence--113357
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per cent of total airtime and space, mostly neutral in tone15. 
The indicator on State regulation of resources and support to the media sector is the second one in this area that 
scores the highest possible risk (97%). The official advertisement (advertising paid by governments and state-owned 
institutions and companies) are distributed by The Directorate General of Press Advertisement (BİK). However, BİK 
has the power to prohibit advertisements to any publication it deems to have violated media ethics. Such sanction can 
create a censorship effect due to the state-dependent structure of the agency. 
The indicator on Independence of PSM governance and funding scores high risk (92%). TRT (state TV channel) was 
defined as an “impartial public legal entity” in the Constitution. However, there is no legal safeguard for appointment 
and dismissal procedures for Director General of the PSM. On May 12, 2017, the director general of TRT was resigned 
by saying “considered it to be necessary”. Then, İbrahim Eren was elected in July 2017. He was one of the former 
directors general of pro-government TV channel ATV and also a high school friend of President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s son, Bilal Erdoğan.
3.4 SOCIAL INCLUSIVENESS (78% - HIGH RISK)
The Social Inclusiveness indicators are concerned with access to media by various groups in society The indicators 
assess regulatory and policy safeguards for community media, and for access to media by minorities, local and regional 
communities, women and people with disabilities. In addition to access to media by specific groups, the media literacy 
context is important for the state of media pluralism. The Social Inclusiveness area therefore also examines the country’s 
media literacy environment, as well as the digital skills of the overall population.
The indicator on Access to media for minorities scores high risk (97%). The 2001 constitutional amendments 
removed the restrictions on the use of ‘language prohibited by law’ in expressing and disseminating ideas in media. 
To implement the reforms, a new regulation came into force on January 25, 2004, allowing private broadcasting in 
minority languages at the national level for the first time. As a result of the reforms, on June 7, 2004, the Turkish 
Radio-Television Corporation (TRT) started to broadcast in five minority languages and dialects (Zaza and Kurmanci 
dialects of Kurdish language, Arabic, Bosnian and Circassian languages). The minority expert consulted by the country 
team stressed that minority groups in Turkey do not have proper access to public or private media. Besides, there are 
no PSM channels for legally recognized minority groups (Greeks, Armenians, Jews). In 2016, IMC TV (nationwide 
TV channel) had programming hours dedicated to Armenians but IMC TV was shut down under the emergency 
statutory decree issued a time after the failed coup attempt. Besides, in 2016, with several TV channels, a channel 
belonging to the largest religious minority Alevis was shut down.16
15  OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2017. Turkey, Constitutional Referendum, 16 April 2017: Needs 
Assessment Mission Report, 08.03.2017, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/303691
16 “12 TV, 11 radyo kanalı kapatıldı” [12 TV 11 radio channels had been shut down], http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/
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The indicator on Access to media for local/regional communities and for community media scores high risk (69%). 
The law No.6112 on the establishment of radio and television enterprises and their Media Services, (Article 3) grants 
regional and local media access to media platforms. Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) is tasked with 
allocating licenses and permits for terrestrial, satellite and cable broadcasting; supervising broadcasting content; and 
imposing sanctions. Under the previous law no. 3984, RTÜK imposed heavy sanctions against dissident and minority 
media and suspended the broadcasting of local, regional and national operators thousands times.17 In practice, even 
though implementation of law no. 6112, there are still unfair sanctions against community media. Especially, after the 
failed coup attempt, over 150 TV and radio channels had been closed with the decrees under the state of emergency, 
including local and regional TV and radio channels as Van TV, Can Erzincan TV etc.
In 2014, the Internet Law No.5651 was amended, broadening the scope of administrative online blocking and allowing 
the authorities to access user data without a warrant. Today, the community online news outlets are constantly targeted 
and blocked by the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK). 
Additionally, in Turkey there are no direct subsidies for commercial broadcasting companies, only the official 
advertisements and announcements distributed by BİK (Directorate General of Press Advertisement) construct 
important sources of revenue for small, independent and local press. But, according to the regulation, published by 
the Official Gazette on October 5 2016, article 39/2, newspapers should be published in Turkish for getting subsidies 
from the Directorate General of Press Advertisement (Basın İlan Kurumu-BİK).18 This regulation was amended two 
times after October 2016, but there is no change on the relevant article 39/2. For this reason, it is hard to say that the 
state subsidies are distributed to local and regional media outlets in fair and transparent manner.
The indicator on Access to media for people with disabilities scores high risk (64%). A recent  regulation (2014) 
requires PSM channels to provide subtitles for deaf people for 30% of all the programs in three years, for 50% of all the 
programs in five years; and private TV channels for 20% of all the programs in three years, for 40% of all the programs 
in five years. However, no steps have been taken to implement this regulation. Additionally, both PSM and private TV 
channels should send statistical data to RTÜK (Radio and Television Supreme Council) in the first three months of 
each year. This regulation does not include any article on audio-description. 
The indicator on Access to media for women scores high risk (82%). In Turkey PSM do not have any gender equality 
policy and also there is no woman on the PSM’s Board of Directors. The share of women among members of 
management boards of private TV companies is unknown. There is no accurate data. According to Global Media 
Monitoring Project 2015 Report in Turkey just 19% of the news staff and 17% of the reporters are women. 19
The indicator on Media Literacy shows high risk (79%). In 2006, a protocol on media literacy had been signed by 
the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) and the Ministry of Education (MEB) for establishing media 
literacy elective courses  in secondary schools. These courses are supposed to  mainly focus on training of children 
on utilization of media and protecting them from the harmful effects of media outlets, not on developing their digital 
skills. 
turkiye/607682/12_TV__11_radyo_kanali_kapatildi.html
17  Radyo ve Televizyon Yayıncılığı Sektör Raporu RTÜK,  [Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) Sectoral Report] 2014:17.
18 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/10/20161005-19.htm
19 Who make news?, GMMP Report 2015, http://cdn.agilitycms.com/who-makes-the-news/Imported/reports_2015/global/
gmmp_  global_report_en.pdf 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Turkey leads the ranks of the worst countries for media pluralism and media freedom in European countries. 
According to the ReportersWithout Borders 2017 World Press Freedom Index, Turkey is ranked 155 and is described 
as “the world’s biggest prison for media personnel”. In Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2018 report Turkey’s 
status declined from Partly Free to Not Free. After July 15, 2016 Coup-attempt and under state of emergency which 
extended six times since July 20, 2016, about 200 media outlets including community and minority media outlets 
were shut-down, about one thousands press cards were cancelled. As of March 15, 2018 153 journalists are in jail. The 
Journalists Union of Turkey stated that more than 10 thousands journalists are unemployed.
The government is criminalizing journalism by using the Anti-terror Law and the Penal Code to aim to create a 
chilling effect on journalists. The Cumhuriyet daily’s trial is the most prominent case that journalists and executives 
imprisoned for changing editorial policy.
Self-censorship is very widespread in the media exercising political and economic control over the media owners. Last 
year, the constitutional referendum process showed how media unfairly covered the political debates. The government 
should safeguard the independence of media authority and redesign it with the participation of journalist associations, 
media representatives, academics and audience. The media authority should be transparent and ensure accurate and 
up-to-date data on media ownership and market concentration.
There is no effective self-regulatory system to protect editorial independence from political interference due to 
ideological polarization.
Collaborative efforts are urgently needed to protect journalists that are faced with overwhelming attacks and sanctions.
Additionally, there are no policies on media literacy, access to media for people with disabilities or on gender equality 
in media. Necessary regulations and policies need to be developed and implemented urgently. 
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